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Power Politics and Princely Debts: Why Germany’s Common Currency 
Failed, 1549-15561 
I. 
Toward the end of the sixteenth century Bartholomäus Sastrow, former legal 
advisor of the dukes of Pomerania and mayor of Stralsund, wrote the story of his life. In 
this vibrant account, he described how in 1542 his brother Johannes, a master at 
Wittenberg University, was travelling home from Rostock where he had taken care of 
some publications.2 For the last leg of the journey Johannes hitched a ride on a cart 
accompanied by a ‘young genteel fellow’ who had taken Pomeranian schillings and 
other coins to the mint at Gadebusch in Mecklenburg. Now he was bringing back 
money amounting to several hundred guldens, which had been minted there. Sastrow 
tells the story because some footpads got wind of the transport and his brother was 
wounded in the ensuing hold-up. The incident shows how dangerous travelling in mid-
sixteenth century Germany was. It also suggests that no-one saw anything unusual in 
                                                 
1
   For their advice on an earlier version of this article thanks are due to Olivier Accominotti, David 
Chilosi, Max-Stephan Schulze and Judy Stephenson. I would also like to thank the participants in the 
Economic History Seminars at the University of Vienna and the London School of Economics and in 
the History Research Seminar at Mannheim University. Last not least thanks go to three unknown 
referees whose comments were extremely constructive and helpful. 
2
  Sastrow and Mohnike, Bartholomäi Sastrowen Herkommen, pp. 195 f. 
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the ‘trade in coinage’ – as contemporaries called it – and that people engaged in it in a 
remarkably open fashion.3 
Trade in coinage was, at any rate, profitable. In Sastrow’s case, the young fellow 
met by his brother supplied a mint with raw material in the form of coins, to the benefit 
of both himself and of the owner of the mint. In return for the money he delivered to 
Gadebusch, he received newly minted coins that contained altogether less bullion, but 
whose total face value was so much higher that the difference did not only cover his 
travelling expenses and transport costs but allowed him to make a profit. In fact, the 
difference also covered the costs of melting and re-minting the coins – of ‘breaking’ 
them, as it was called –,4 so that the owners of the mint, the dukes of Mecklenburg, 
were able to share in the profit. 
We are here observing the workings of Gresham’s law, which in its most widely 
quoted form states that bad money drives out good. The problem was by no means 
exclusively German,5 but in the Holy Roman Empire it was particularly acute: There, a 
large number of authorities were free to issue currencies without any superior ruler 
interfering in their right to determine the standard of their coinage.6 As clearly defined 
                                                 
3
  Trade in coinage (‘kauffmanschafft in der muntz’): e.g. Staatsarchiv Würzburg (hereafter: StArchWü), 
MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 42 v. For the sake of brevity the name Germany is here often used instead 
of ‘Holy Roman Empire’.  
4
  Breaking (‘brechen’) coins: E.g. StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 8 r.; cf. Hirsch, Eröfnetes 
Geheimnus, p. 123. 
5
  Dutu, ‘Moneychangers’, p. 565 f.  
6
  Rössner, Deflation, p. 566. 
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borders between currency areas did not exist, consumers faced a multiplicity of 
monetary units many of which were deliberately designed to look broadly similar.7 
Even if the ‘common man’ saw through such attempts at cheating, he was rarely in a 
position to resist merchants or members of the nobility who forced coins on him at 
exchange rates at which they were overvalued.8 On occasion, though, even revenue 
officials let light money slip through: ‘All the sacks are already full of base pfennigs, as 
your princely grace will discover in your receipts from convoy duties, taxes and rents’, 
warned the mint master of the elector of Saxony in about 1520, and in 1564 the 
Swabian, Bavarian and Franconian estates voiced similar concerns.9 While some 
political actors obviously benefited from the status quo that allowed them breaking their 
neighbours’ coins, all had thus reason to worry that another neighbour might produce 
even worse money that would end up in their coffers. 
Unsurprisingly, there were frequent complaints of authorities who looked on 
helplessly as their relatively good coins disappeared in their neighbours’ melting pots. 
                                                 
7
  Cf. e.g. the electoral-Saxon monetary ordinance of 1534 that warned consumers of such so-called 
‘Beischläge’. Des Chürfürsten und Hertzog Georgen zu Sachssen etc. Muntz Ordenung, unpaginated 
(p. 8). 
8
  Rössner, Deflation, pp. 574 f., found that informational asymmetries, whose importance prior research 
stressed (Velde, Weber, and Wright, ‘A Model of Commodity Money’; Volckart, ‘Regeln’), were no 
necessary condition for the functioning of Gresham’s Law: The unequal bargaining power of 
consumers of different social status was often sufficient. For the ‘common man’ – as authorities liked 
to call anyone of non-noble status, though they increasingly referred to peasants only – see Blickle, 
Obedient Germans, pp. 5 f. 
9
  Bahrfeldt, Münzwesen, p. 411; Lori, Sammlung, vol. 2, p. 2. 
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In 1539, for example, the council of Hamburg claimed that many burghers were 
importing sacks and barrels full of underweight 3- and 6-pfennigs-pieces that came 
presumably from Holstein and Denmark. They exchanged them for the city’s own full-
bodied coins, which they sent abroad, ‘thus seeking their own illegitimate self-interest 
and advantage, to the ruin of all good money’.10 Ten years later, at a conference the 
imperial diet had called to deal with this problem, the delegates of the Austrian 
Habsburgs and the archbishop of Salzburg claimed that ‘for many years their own and 
their predecessors’ and ancestors’ praiseworthy heavy coins had been exported, sent to 
the crucible and broken, and instead a large number of uneven, poor and foreign coins 
by and by been imported, to the great damage and disadvantage of the German nation 
and the common man’.11 In 1559 the archbishop asserted that less than one-twentieth of 
the value of all purchases in his principality was paid in domestic coin. The greater part 
of the output of his mint was exported, all the more so because he could not afford 
enough troops to patrol the border: ‘The world is wide, the people many, the mountains 
are high, and it will never be possible to plug each and every hole’.12 
As the archbishop realised, stricter controls were impracticable. There were only 
two solutions to the problem, and only one that went to its root. First, authorities could 
debase their coins until their intrinsic value matched that of the ‘bad’ money which had 
                                                 
10
  Bollandt, ed., Burspraken, vol. 2, p. 322. 
11
  Lori, Sammlung, vol. 1, p. 226. 
12
  Leeb, ed., Der Kurfürstentag, pp. 1721 f. The archbishop’s claim is of course not reliable in 
quantitative terms, and data on the volume of the trade in coinage do not exist. However, according to 
Schüttenhelm, ‘Zur Münzprägung’, p. 165, this trade was at least as important for the metal supply of 
mints as the purchase of raw silver. 
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entered their territory, hoping that this would prevent their export. The danger was that 
this might trigger rounds of competitive debasements – as was indeed the case where 
the approach was tried.13 The other, more fundamental solution was creating a common 
currency that would not only leave no scope for the trade in coinage at least within the 
Empire,14 but would also help legitimate commerce. Political actors were aware of the 
burden which the multiplicity of currencies imposed on trade. The councillors of the 
elector of Brandenburg, for example, argued that without monetary unification ‘little of 
the large damage suffered by merchants and all who trade, travel and journey from one 
country to another ( … ) will be removed or healed’.15 However, compared to the harm 
the trade in coinage did this was a side issue that mostly fell under the general heading 
of ‘furthering the common good’. As the concluding document of the conference where 
Austria and Salzburg complained about the export of their money put it: ‘Through a 
                                                 
13
  See e.g. the spread of underweight and uneven batzens and mariengroschens in the years after 1500. 
Cf. Geiger, ‘Entstehung und Ausbreitung’; Rüthing, ‘Zur Geschichte’. Mayhew, Coinage, p. 26, 
argues that such guerres monétaires account for much of the debasement (the reduction in weight or 
fineness or increase in the nominal value of coins) which late medieval Europe experienced. Girard, 
‘Un phénomène économique’, p. 216, saw the trouble spreading from Germany. More generally on 
debasements: Munro, ‘Coinage Debasements’, esp. pp. 29 f. 
14
  The export outside the Empire’s jurisdiction would still remain a problem, as the archbishop of 
Salzburg pointed out in 1559. Leeb, ed., Der Kurfürstentag, p. 1721. 
15
  Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, I. Hauptabteilung, Repositur 15, no. 1 (hereafter: 
GStAPK, I. HA, Rep. 15, no. 1), E, fol. 3 r. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, markets that 
used the same currency were significantly better integrated than others. Boerner and Volckart, ‘Utility 
of a Common Coinage’, p. 62. 
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stable and common currency the common weal should be advanced and all unseemly 
profit eliminated’.16 
This article examines how Charles V and the imperial estates tried to create such a 
common currency, with the focus being on the bill of 1551.17 Giving due consideration 
to the institutions of the Holy Roman Empire that shaped decision making processes 
and affected their outcomes, it explains how and why the relevant actors became 
distracted by other ends that they believed to be able to reach at the same time and 
through monetary policies: Next to unifying the German currencies, reducing the 
burden of debts and weakening political opponents became increasingly important. The 
main hypothesis is that this crucially contributed to the failure of the so far most 
promising attempt to reduce the country’s monetary diversity.  
The paper speaks both to research on German monetary history and to the 
continuing reassessment of the relative economic importance of the Holy Roman 
Empire and its members. In a wider sense, it thus concerns the question of how political 
institutions and the distribution of power between several levels of sovereignty affected 
the functioning of pre-modern economies. Recent research has tended to stress the 
importance of overarching polities for fostering long-distance exchange; to what extent 
the Empire was able to fulfil this function is a question to which this article relates.18 
                                                 
16
  Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg (hereafter: StArchLu), B 113 I Bü 1794, fol. 4 r. 
17
  The first attempt to create a common German currency was made in 1524; for its failure see Volckart, 
‘Reichsmünzordnung’, pp. 28 f. It played no role in the mid-sixteenth century negotiations. 
18
  Cf. Chilosi and Volckart, ‘Money’, pp. 783 f.; Chilosi, Schulze and Volckart, Benefits of Empire? pp. 
28 ff.; see also Spruyt, The Sovereign State, esp. pp. 113-129. 
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The next section (II) presents a review of the sources, the section thereafter (III) an 
overview of monetary conditions in the Holy Roman Empire. Section IV introduces the 
currency bill published in 1551. The drafting of the bill is analysed, with the focus being 
on the question of whose interests prevailed in this process. Section V discusses why the 
new common currency failed, and section VI summarizes the hypotheses of the article. 
II. 
Much of the research on the history of pre-modern currency unions implicitly or 
explicitly refers to economic hypotheses about the emergence and consequences of 
modern unions. From an economic perspective these issues are still under dispute. Some 
authors argue that monetary integration requires the prior integration of trade; others 
emphasize that commerce grows in consequence of monetary integration, implying that 
currency unions can be imposed by an act of political will.19 In nuce, Schrötter’s 
seminal work on the attempts to create a common currency in the Holy Roman Empire 
of the sixteenth century already contained these views;20 meanwhile, they have been 
developed more fully. On the one hand, monetary unification is said to have failed 
because the political will was lacking: The emperors were unable to prevail among the 
many political actors whom they faced.21 On the other hand, it is claimed that Germany 
was economically too poorly integrated to allow a for common currency. Usually 
estates who controlled their own silver mines are contrasted with others who had to 
                                                 
19
  The relevant economic literature is quoted by Wolf and Ritschl, ‘Endogeneity of Currency Areas’. 
20
  Schrötter, ‘Münzwesen, Teil I’; Schrötter, ‘Münzwesen, Teil II’. 
21
  E.g. Vorel, Monetary Circulation, p. 133; cf. Schrötter, ‘Münzwesen, Teil I’, p. 142 
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purchase the metal on the open market: Silver prices diverged so far that agreeing on a 
common standard was impossible.22  
While these hypotheses concern the general failure of sixteenth-century Germany to 
create a common currency, the scant literature on the bill of 1551 claims that the main 
reason why it did not succeed was that it did not integrate one of Germany’s most 
popular coins, i.e. the taler: It gave talers a value in new money that their producers 
found unacceptably low.23 Research has barely addressed, far less satisfactorily 
answered the question of why this decision was made.24 The present article develops an 
alternative explanation of why Germany’s common currency failed. It also asks why 
political actors valued traditional monetary units – among them the taler – in the way 
they did. In this, the article goes beyond the documentary evidence that prior research 
has used and that had not grown much above what was available to Schrötter more than 
a hundred years ago. 
This is possible because in recent years a large number of so far poorly known 
sources have become available. Today, more information about the imperial diets 
important in the present context than ever before is easily accessible.25 Often, though, 
                                                 
22
  E.g. Blaich, Die Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 17 ff., 258; cf. Christmann, Vereinheitlichung des 
Münzwesens, pp. 46 f.; North, ‘Geld- und Ordnungspolitik’, p. 94. 
23
  Rittmann, Geldgeschichte, p. 198; Christmann, Vereinheitlichung des Münzwesens, p. 71; North, 
‘Handelsexpansion’, p. 173; Vorel, Monetary Circulation, p. 92.  
24
  Schrötter, ‘Münzwesen, Teil II’, pp. 51 f., rather helplessly concluded that the talers had been secretly 
debased and that the value the bill gave them reflected this. 
25
  See esp. Aulinger, ed., Reichstag zu Worms, 2 vols.; Machoczek, ed., Reichstag zu Augsburg, vols. 1 
and 3; Eltz, ed., Reichstag zu Augsburg, 2 vols. 
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when complex problems had to be solved, the diets convoked conferences to deal with 
these matters. Where monetary policies were concerned, they called münztage, i.e. 
coinage conferences where delegates sent by the estates of the Empire developed 
solutions which would be submitted to the next diet.26 One such conference took place 
in Speyer between 10 September and 5 November 1549. It played a crucial role in 
preparing the common German currency adopted by the diet of Augsburg in 1551, and 
is in the focus of the present article. 
Research has largely passed over this conference,27 but a hitherto unknown source 
sheds so much light on it that its importance can no longer be overlooked. The 
Würzburg State Archive, whose core is the archive of the prince-bishopric of Würzburg, 
holds the minutes of the meeting.28 This is a highly unusual source. The imperial diets 
and the conferences called by them are often well documented, but minutes are still rare 
and probably unique where the Empire’s economic policies are concerned. The source 
frequently refers to additional material, for example to memoranda or concepts, and of 
course to the recess, i.e. the concluding document that summarized the results of the 
discussions. None of these documents are preserved in Würzburg. However, some have 
been kept in the archive of the electors of Brandenburg in Berlin, while Ludwigsburg 
                                                 
26
  Cf. Neuhaus, Repräsentationsformen, pp. 360-72. 
27
  But see Schrötter, ‘Münzwesen, Teil II’, pp. 101 f. Neuhaus, Repräsentationsformen, p. 367 with FN 
30, Christmann, Vereinheitlichung des Münzwesens, p. 64, and Vorel, Monetary Circulation, pp. 88 f., 
mention the conference. 
28
  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, 108 fols. 
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Archive in Württemberg holds much of the rest of the missing material.29 Taken 
together, these sources allow drawing a uniquely comprehensive picture of how 
monetary policies were formulated at the level of the Empire in the middle of the 
sixteenth century. 
III. 
In early April 1551, experts in coinage and metallurgy from all over Germany 
gathered in Nuremberg to assay and evaluate the money circulating in the Empire. The 
report they submitted to Charles V at the end of May listed 133 types of gold coins 
issued by 66 minting authorities within the Empire, 55 types of gold coins minted by 29 
foreign authorities, 130 types of silver coins from 76 German authorities, and 28 types 
of silver coins struck by 13 authorities abroad. Many of these had been in circulation for 
decades.30 The document – to which we will return because it gained considerable 
importance for monetary policies – gives a first impression of how diverse the money 
was that one would encounter on markets in mid-sixteenth-century Germany. In fact, 
the diversity was still larger: In the 1540s about 125 authorities within the Empire alone 
were issuing coins.31 Some of these circulated only locally; others were used all over 
Germany and beyond. The golden rhinegulden for example, jointly minted by the 
electors of Mainz, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate, was hugely popular in long-
distance trade. So was the silver taler, the most prestigious product of the mints of the 
                                                 
29
  The sources from Berlin were used by Schrötter, ‘Münzwesen, Teil II’, p. 101. Cf. GStAPK, I. HA, 
Rep. 15, Nr. 1 D-G; also StArchLu, B 113 I Bü 1794. 
30
  Hirsch, Münz-Archiv, vol. 1, pp. 323-43. 
31
  Based on data in Prokisch, Grunddaten, passim. 
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dukes and electors of Saxony, widely imitated by German and foreign rulers and to be 
found on markets all over the Empire.32 The Austrian silver gulden was considerably 
lighter and less popular.33 
Despite their diversity, the German currencies had one thing in common. Like 
elsewhere in Europe, they were based on bullion: on gold, silver or both. Bimetallic 
currencies, consisting of both gold and silver coins, have often been described as 
particularly sensitive to changes in the relative prices of these metals: Once the ratio 
between the values of the coins minted from both metals has been legally defined, a rise 
in the market price of one metal creates incentives to withdraw coins made of it from 
circulation and sell them as bullion. Such currencies therefore tend to revert to 
monometallism. As culling coins, melting them and selling the metal is not costless, 
things do not quite work like that. Monetary arbitrage is profitable only if the market 
ratio diverges so far from the legal ratio that the difference covers the costs the 
arbitrageur has to bear. For this reason nineteenth-century bimetallism, for example, 
was more stable than the common view would lead one to expect.34 In any case, there is 
a third possible outcome apart from precarious stability and the return to 
monometallism: Coins whose value is rising may circulate at a premium.35 Further 
                                                 
32
  The name taler was first used for the imitation minted since 1520 in Jáchymov/Joachimsthal in 
Bohemia. The Saxon original had been called güldengroschen. Cf. Castelin, ‘Entstehung’. 
33
  Newald, Münzwesen, p. 6. 
34
  Cf. Flandreau, ‘Water Seeks a Level’, who quotes the relevant literature. 
35
  Cf. Redish, Bimetallism, p. 30. 
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down, we will revisit the question of which of these outcomes came about in mid-
sixteenth-century Germany and for what reason. 
As the Empire produced little gold, authorities planning to issue gold coins had to 
find other sources of supply. The electors on the Rhine solved this problem by 
exploiting their geographical position. In the fifteenth century, the Rhine had developed 
into the most important artery of trans-continental trade that linked the two 
economically most advanced parts of Europe, i.e. Italy and the Netherlands.36 The 
customs posts that the electors maintained along the river demanded payments in gold, 
and this allowed supplying their mints with raw material and minting rhineguldens.37 
Silver, by contrast, was to a large extent a domestic product, though deposits were 
of course distributed unevenly. The Saxon Ore Mountains, Schwaz in Tirol and 
Jáchymov/Joachimsthal in Bohemia were the most important centres of production.38 
The estates controlling them, collectively often called the ‘mountain lords’, were 
interested in limiting the damage done by the export of their own and the import of 
underweight foreign coins. In the lengthy discussions about a common German 
currency that took place e.g. during the diet of Worms in 1545 they therefore 
consistently advocated a relatively high mint equivalent: They demanded that the 
nominal sum minted from a given quantity of fine silver should be so large – or, 
conversely, the bullion content of the individual coins so low – that exporting and 
                                                 
36
  Chilosi and Volckart, ‘Money’, p. 784. 
37
  Weisenstein, Münz- und Geldwesen, p. 171.  
38
  Munro, ‘Monetary Origins’, p. 8. 
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melting the money would no longer pay.39 This demand betrayed their lack of 
confidence in the viability of a common currency. They evidently expected any 
agreement to be violated by free-riders trying to benefit from breaking the new coins. 
As the estates without access to silver mines favoured a lower mint equivalent – 
probably because this implied a higher intrinsic value of the coins and a corresponding 
fall in nominal prices – all negotiations failed.40 
However, the second half of the 1540s saw a momentous increase in the power of 
the emperor that would change the picture. While the diet of Worms was still debating 
the currency question, Charles V began forging the alliance he needed to proceed 
against the Protestant estates united in the Schmalkaldic League. One of his main 
supporters was Duke Maurice of Saxony, who was a Protestant himself and the cousin 
of the Saxon Elector John Frederick ‘the magnanimous’. The war, once begun, quickly 
turned in the emperor’s favour. John Frederick was defeated and taken prisoner in April 
1547; he lost the electorship and most of his lands, both of which Charles granted to 
Maurice. The other leader of the Schmalkaldic League, the landgrave of Hesse, 
submitted voluntarily; like John Frederick he spent years as Charles’ captive. In late 
1547, when the emperor convened the ‘diet-in-arms’ in Augsburg, he seemed the 
undisputed master of Germany. In Augsburg, it was decided to call a conference to once 
                                                 
39
  Cf. Eltz, ed. Der Speyrer Reichstag, vol. 1, p. 341; Lori, Sammlung, vol. 1, p. 226. In fact, such a pre-
emptive debasement would have made no difference. The likelihood of a coin being exported and 
broken did not depend on its bullion content.  
40
  Cf. Schrötter, ‘Münzwesen, Teil II’, p. 103. 
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and for all solve the currency problems besetting the Empire.41 This conference was to 
meet in Speyer in February 1549, but was soon postponed to September of that year. 
IV. 
To represent him, Charles chose two commissioners: Philip von Flersheim, who 
was bishop of Speyer, and Count Reinhard von Solms.42 Flersheim had studied the law 
and gained a doctorate. He had years of experience as princely and imperial councillor, 
had attended many imperial diets and had his residence in Speyer, which despite his age 
(he was born in 1481) and poor health made him an obvious choice as commissioner. 
Solms had earned his spurs as one of Charles’ captains in the Schmalkaldic War. He did 
not have any further experience in politics, but his bare presence would remind the 
delegates of who dominated the Empire in military terms.43 
Many, but by no means all imperial estates sent representatives to Speyer. All 
electors except Saxony,44 22 of the almost 300 princes, counts and barons and 10 of the 
c. 80 free and imperial cities did so.45 North-German estates were not entirely absent, 
but the south and west of the country were covered better. This was no doubt a result of 
the higher costs north-German princes and cities faced when sending their councillors 
so far south. Some saved costs by letting the lawyers they maintained at the imperial 
                                                 
41
 Machoczek, ed., Reichstag zu Augsburg, vol. 3, p. 2021. 
42
  Charles’ instructions for his commissioners: GStAPK, I. HA, Rep. 15, Nr. 1 D, fol. 3 v - 5 v. 
43
  Ammerich, ‘Philipp Freiherr von Flersheim’; Poten, ‘Reinhart der Aeltere’. 
44
  The king of Bohemia never attended the electoral college. Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old 
Clothes, p. 105. 
45
  Cf. the imperial register of 1521. Wrede, ed., Reichstagsakten, vol. 2, pp. 427-442. 
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chamber court in Speyer represent them at the conference, too (this is how 
Bartholomäus Sastrow came to attend),46 but estates not involved in law suits had to pay 
or reimburse their delegates to the tune of sometimes thousands of talers.47 
Understandably, some commissioned joint representatives. Apart from the two imperial 
commissioners 40 delegates took part in the discussions: lawyers, mint- and other 
officials, members of urban councils and some whose position cannot be ascertained.48 
Proceedings at Speyer mirrored those of an imperial diet, though the ceremonial 
issues and questions of hierarchy whose importance recent research is stressing played a 
smaller role.49 Early in the conference there was an extended tussle between the 
delegates of the dukes of Württemberg and Pomerania about who should sit nearer the 
top of the table (the Pomeranians, as it turned out),50 but then everybody got down to 
business. Like an imperial diet, the delegates in Speyer formed three colleges: an 
electoral, a princely and an urban one. Within the colleges, decisions were reached by 
asking the members for their opinion in their order of rank.51 Thus, in the electors’ 
college the delegate of the elector of Mainz, who ranked highest, would propose the 
question to be discussed. Then the councillors of the electors of Trier, Cologne, the 
Palatinate and Brandenburg stated their views and arguments (in that order), and Mainz 
                                                 
46
  GStAPK, I. HA, Rep. 15, Nr. 1 D, fol. 32 v. 
47
  After another coinage conference in 1557 the delegate of Brandenburg claimed 4,000 talers. GStAPK, 
I. HA, Rep. 15, Nr. 1 D, no. 11. 
48
  GStAPK, I. HA, Rep. 15, Nr. 1 D, fol. 31 r – 33 v. 
49
  Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes, pp. 32 ff. 
50
  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 22 r. 
51
  Cf. Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes, p. 35. 
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summed up the result, adding his own opinion.52 The highest ranking member – in the 
princes’ college Austria who often made joint statements with Bavaria, among the cities 
Nuremberg – thus had the strongest influence. The questioning process would be 
repeated until unanimity was reached or, if the delegates felt that this was not possible, 
it was decided to apply the majority principle.53 
In all this the cities’ college played a subsidiary role. However, whereas at imperial 
diets the urban representatives were often left in the dark, receiving for example no 
written records of the decisions made by the other colleges,54 in Speyer the other 
councillors at least kept them regularly informed (anything else would have been 
difficult as one delegate sat in both the electors’ and cities’ and another in all three 
colleges).55 After about three weeks of discussions, the Austrian and Bavarian delegates 
suggested a more regular approach: The disputed points were to be discussed first in the 
princely college, ‘and once they had finished and come to a conclusion, this should be 
presented to the electoral councillors. When this had been done and both parties were 
content, they’ – the Austrians and Bavarians – ‘would be happy enough if the results 
were submitted and made known to the urban councillors. Then a common committee 
of all three colleges might be formed and one might proceed to other matters’.56 In fact, 
some days later not one but two inter-collegial committees with seven or eight members 
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  See e.g. the proceedings on 4 Oct.: StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 53 v. - 54 r. 
53
  As the princely delegates remarked at one point, it was ‘not very common to go against the majority’. 
GStAPK, I. HA, Rep. 15, Nr. 1 D, fol. 17 r. 
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  Luttenberger, ‘Reichspolitik’, pp. 29 ff. 
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  E.g. StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fols. 29 r., 32 r., 46 r.  
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  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 51 r. 
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each were established to consider particularly difficult questions. Such committees 
continued to play a crucial role,57 preparing the decisions made by the conference at 
large. 
In Speyer, the standard of the new common currency was determined. The relation 
between gold and silver was discussed, too, though an agreement was reached only on 
the following imperial diet that took place from July 1550 to February 1551 in 
Augsburg. The diet also agreed that the currency bill should be published only once it 
had been decided what to do with the money in circulation. A re-coinage where the 
estates minted and held back so many coins that the old money could be withdrawn and 
replaced within a short period of time would have overtaxed them financially and 
organisationally. The diet therefore convoked the Nuremberg assay for spring 1551 that 
was mentioned above. There, the bullion content of the money in circulation was to be 
determined. On this basis, the rates were to be fixed at which it should continue in 
circulation until enough new money had been minted. The assay ended in May, and in 
July 1551 Charles V published the currency bill, the ‘Augsburg Imperial Monetary 
Ordinance’.58 
The most striking feature of the ordinance was that all coins mentioned in it were 
valued in kreuzers that resembled the traditional Austrian coin of the same name. The 
largest silver piece was a 72-kreuzers-coin called guldiner, which jointly with the 
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  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 57 r., cf. ibid., fol. 72 v. 
58
  Hirsch, Münz-Archiv, vol. 1, pp. 344-64. 
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kreuzers and their other multiples formed the Empire’s common currency.59 The 
ordinance also recognized the golden rhinegulden which it gave the same value as the 
guldiner, thus establishing a fully-fledged bimetallic currency comparable to those of 
France and England. Concerning the old money, the bill specified that ‘next to our new 
imperial coins described above, the talers so far issued in the Empire of the German 
nation are to be taken and given for 68 kreuzers’.60 This applied to full-bodied talers 
only – light versions whose rates were lower were listed, too. The bill closed with a 
long catalogue of other domestic and foreign coins also valued in kreuzers. This money 
was to be used freely for four months, and for another twelve months at the rates given 
in the bill. From then on, it was ‘entirely prohibited and done away with, and should be 
neither taken nor given in any payment’.61 
With regard to the standard of the silver coinage, the Speyer conference started out 
from a proposition Charles V’s brother King Ferdinand had made during the ‘diet-in-
arms’: He had suggested a 60-kreuzers-piece whose bullion content, while being lower 
than that of the current Austrian silver gulden and much lower than what the estates 
without silver mines of their own had hoped for, was higher than what the mountain 
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  The bill also recognised 5 regional silver currencies and 8 regional types of pfennigs that were linked 
to the guldiner. For hellers (½-pfennigs), it merely defined a maximum mint equivalent. In some 
respects, the ordinance was highly innovative: It determined that all coins were to be marked with 
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as legal tender to payments up to 8⅓ guldiners. Hirsch, Münz-Archiv, vol. 1, pp. 346-9. 
60
  Ibid., p. 350. 
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  Ibid., p. 353. 
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lords had so far demanded.62 Flersheim and Solms soon convinced the delegates that 
this was a practicable compromise.63 The ease with which they were able to do so 
suggests that now, for the first time, there was widespread belief in the viability of the 
planned currency. Apparently, the mountain lords were willing to agree to a relatively 
low mint equivalent because they assumed that since the Schmalkaldic War the emperor 
was powerful enough to prevent free-riders from breaking the common coins. This 
suggests that their previous failure to agree on a common currency had not been due to a 
fundamental lack of economic integration. Put differently, once the main obstacle to 
harmonisation – the fear of one’s coins being broken in neighbouring mints – had been 
removed, it became obvious that the Empire’s bullion markets were in principle seen as 
integrated well enough to allow an agreement.64 
In Speyer, the delegates abandoned Ferdinand’s original idea of a 60-kreuzers-
piece, but the new 72-kreuzers-piece was to have a proportional bullion content. 72 
kreuzers were chosen on account of conditions in Bohemia and South Germany. In 
1542, King Ferdinand had fixed the exchange rate of the rhinegulden at that value, two 
years later, the Bohemian estates had followed, and in 1547, the city of Augsburg had 
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  Machoczek, ed., Reichstag zu Augsburg, vol. 3, pp. 2010 ff. 
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  28 Sept., i.e. after 2½ weeks of discussions which mostly concerned the question of whether the 
largest coin should be a 72- or a 24-kreuzers-piece. StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 33 v.-34 r. 
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done the same.65 In 1549, the delegates in Speyer decided to apply this rate to the new 
silver guldiner, too. 
The question of whether this silver coin and the golden rhinegulden should be 
perfectly fungible took up more of the delegates’ time and energy than any other issue. 
The imperial commissioners and the princely councillors enthusiastically advocated 
such a system. They invoked the ‘common man’ who, they said, was often required to 
pay gold that he had to purchase at constantly increasing rates.66 Austria’s and Bavaria’s 
reference to the duke of Jülich, who had ‘taken pity’ and ordered his custom posts to 
accept silver instead,67 indicates that they were thinking of commerce: In this context, 
the ‘common man’ was the merchant who carried a weight of custom duties that grew 
as long as gold was appreciating. Laying down the gold-silver ratio in imperial law 
would therefore help trade. 
Since the 1520s, gold was indeed appreciating on many markets. On average, the 
bimetallic ratio grew from 1:11.27 between 1525 and 1529 to 1:13.09 between 1545 and 
1549: an increase of more than 16 per cent.68 Under these conditions merchants 
doubtless did find it harder to pay toll charges demanded in gold. Still, for the policies 
pursued by Charles V’s commissioners and the delegates of the princes other objectives 
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  Lori, Sammlung, p. 224; Newald, Münzwesen, p. 113; Blendinger, ed., Unterkaufbücher, p. 33. 
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  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 34 v. 
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  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 37 v.  
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  For the bimetallic ratio see Chilosi and Volckart, ‘Money’. For the likely cause, the import of silver 
from Spanish-America, see Pieper, ‘Silver Production’, esp. p. 90; Braudel and Spooner, ‘Prices in 
Europe’, pp. 444 f.; cf. tab. 1. 
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apart from the desire to support trade played a role. Flersheim left no doubt about this: 
He argued that as bishop of Speyer he had to purchase the gold he needed to repay his 
debts from merchants, and this with growing difficulties, high costs and insufferable 
fees: ‘It is intolerable that it should not be allowed to pay with the silver piece 
instead’.69 
Flersheim was not alone in facing this problem. At the imperial diet of Speyer 1544, 
the Saxon delegation had presented a memorandum claiming that there were hardly any 
princes of the Empire – particularly secular ones – who were not burdened with debts; 
few had yearly revenues above 100,000 guldens, ‘and more than one with an income of 
barely 50,000 guldens must pay 20- or 30,000 guldens (…) a year to service his debts 
and stop the usurer’s mouth’.70 The memorandum aimed at demonstrating the princes’ 
inability to pay taxes to the Empire and should be taken with a grain of salt. However, 
its gist is borne out by research on the finances of individual rulers. In the early 1560s 
Charles V’s brother Ferdinand for example, who by then was emperor, had revenues of 
c. 970,000 guldens per year. About half of these had to be earmarked for servicing debts 
of altogether c. 7.8 million guldens (a debt-to-revenue ratio of 8.0 to 1).71 In 1550, the 
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  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 47 v. Flersheim’s argument mirrored nominalist ideas that 
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of debts contracted in the ‘Kipper-and-Wipper’-period. North, ‘Geld- und Ordnungpolitik’, p. 98. 
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  Eltz, ed., Der Speyrer Reichstag, vol. 3, p. 1233. 
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Duke of Württemberg had yearly revenues of c. 125,000 and debts of 1.7 million 
guldens: a ratio of 13.7 to 1.72 At the same time, Maurice of Saxony was in much better 
position with a debt-to-revenue ratio of 1.8 to 1.73 By comparison, the English ratio was 
0.8 to 1 at the death of Edward VI in 1553 and 0.9 to 1 at the accession of Elisabeth five 
years later.74 
Given the recent rise in the price of gold, the emperor and the estates may have 
expected silver to continue depreciating, but for the servicing of debts it did not matter 
how relative prices would develop: Bimetallism always benefited debtors as long as it 
was possible to buy coins – if necessary abroad or in exchange for raw bullion – at rates 
reflecting their supply and demand, while creditors could be forced to accept them at 
their legal value. The indebted princes of the Empire must have found this prospect far 
more appealing than the idea that bimetallism might help struggling merchants. 
Whether the imperial commissioners consciously used it to rally support for the new 
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  Bütterlin, Geldpolitik, p. 25.  
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‘Finance’, p. 59 (Hesse); and more generally Klein, Geschichte der öffentlichen Finanzen, pp. 18 f. 
and Press, ‘Formen des Ständewesens’, p. 292. 
74
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23 
 
currency is not known, but two things should be noted: First, the argument apparently 
helped reaching an agreement at least among the princely delegates whose will to co-
operate was evident, and second, it seems clear that from this point, the project of 
creating a common currency began to come off the rails. So far, all had agreed that the 
aim was preventing the trade in coinage; now a group of estates emerged who realized 
that monetary policies could be used for other purposes, too. 
The electors’ delegates opposed the fungibility of guldiner and rhinegulden 
vigorously. As Brandenburg – the lowest-ranking electorate – carried little weight and 
Saxony had not sent a representative to Speyer, the interests of the electors of Mainz, 
Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate prevailed. Their councillors disputed the key argument 
of the princely delegates and the Imperial commissioners: They called into question that 
creditors would allow themselves to be forced to depart from the letter of their contracts 
and accept silver in place of gold.75 However, this was not their only and probably not 
even their main concern. Another argument was that if the rhinegulden was treated as 
equivalent of a 72 kreuzers silver coin, ‘gold ( … ) will in its entirety be exported from 
the German nation’.76 The electoral councillors did not explain why they anticipated 
this, but their concern was well-founded. When King Ferdinand, the Bohemian estates 
and Augsburg valued the rhinegulden at 72 kreuzers, this had applied to coins of the 
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Austrian standard of 1535. The 72-kreuzers-piece planned at Speyer was to be struck at 
a higher mint equivalent, that is, with a proportionally lower content of fine silver. 
Equating the rhinegulden with such a coin meant depressing the official value of gold 
far below its rate in neighbouring countries.77 As long as this difference was large 
enough to cover transport and re-minting costs, everybody experienced in the trade in 
coinage would face incentives to purchase gold in e.g. Frankfurt, Augsburg or Hamburg 
and to sell it in Paris or some other place where its official value was higher. 
Bimetallism would indeed revert to monometallism. 
The mountain lords did not object. As early as in 1545 the Saxon Elector John 
Frederick ‘the magnanimous’ had declared that ‘thank God, the German nation can do 
very well without gold’,78 and his cousin and successor Maurice no doubt agreed with 
him at least in this point. Austria’s interests matched those of Saxony: Without any 
formal decision having been made, the main role in the new currency would devolve on 
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the metal they were producing.79 The Rhenish electors, by contrast, would be seriously 
harmed: After all, up to 60 per cent of their revenues were generated at their custom 
posts, most of which were located on the Rhine and demanded gold.80 The electoral 
delegates at Speyer roundly rejected a bimetallic currency. 
After three weeks of rather repetitive discussions, Flersheim presented a new 
argument. He warned the electoral councillors that ‘it had been found how dangerous it 
was to damage his Majesty’s reputation, grandeur etc., as had become quite evident 
during the late war, when his Majesty had not set himself so strongly against Saxony 
and Hesse because of reasons of religion, but because of their lack of obedience’.81 The 
electoral delegates may not have expected Charles V to go to war over the rhinegulden, 
but the emperor’s displeasure was still not to be taken lightly: He used it strategically 
and often with success to discipline the estates and generate compliance.82 In Speyer, 
nerves frayed further when it became known that Solms had left for Charles’ court in 
Brussels ‘to obtain an imperial resolution’. The electoral councillors became very upset 
about this – they had never requested such a resolution – did not need one, either –,83 
and sure enough, when after about two weeks Solms returned with Charles V’s letter, it 
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appeared that the emperor backed the delegates of the princes. He had got hold of a 
copy of a memorandum where they had summarized their point of view and in which he 
had taken ‘gracious pleasure’. Now he ordered his commissioners, specifically 
Flersheim, to make sure that all delegates voted accordingly – not at some future diet 
but ‘now, at the current coinage conference’.84 This Flersheim failed to do. The 
delegates of the electors dug in their heels, claiming that their lords had not expected 
this dispute and had given them no pertinent instructions. On 5 November the 
conference ended without an agreement on the point of bimetallism.85 
In the following months the Rhenish electors tried to approach the emperor directly; 
they moreover sought support among their peers in Saxony and Brandenburg.86 
Flersheim and Solms, who in view of their failure to engineer an agreement in Speyer 
lived themselves under the shadow of the emperor’s displeasure, now tightened the 
screws. Just before the next diet opened in Augsburg in July 1550, they required the 
delegates of Mainz, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate to appear in their lodgings, 
forbade them to seek further advice in monetary matters, set them a time limit and then 
ordered them out of the room – all this in a tone that before Charles’ victory in the 
Schmalkaldic War would have been unthinkable between representatives of the emperor 
and the highest-ranking estates of the Empire.87 Once the diet had begun, the electors 
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did find some support: The cities’ college submitted a memorandum that repeated the 
arguments of the electoral councillors at Speyer.88 The urban delegates at Augsburg 
were clearly unconvinced of the idea that bimetallism would help trade, but their 
memorandum was to no avail. The diet drafted the currency bill in accordance with 
what had been discussed in Speyer, including the valuation of both rhinegulden and 
guldiner as 72-kreuzers-pieces, and when the recess summarizing the bill’s main points 
was brought forward on 14 February 1551, the Rhenish electors signed.89 
In Augsburg the estates decided that each of the ten circles into which the Empire 
was divided should send a group of representatives to the assay at Nuremberg where the 
value of the money in circulation was to be determined. Most circles did so, but not the 
Upper Saxon one, of which Saxony was a part. While the assay was taking place, the 
councillors of the Saxon Elector Maurice, who had other business in Nuremberg, 
repeatedly wrote him, warning that the absence of a Saxon coinage expert might harm 
him, but he did not react.90 Maurice’s representatives had signed the recess of 
Augsburg.91 They had thereby endorsed both the currency bill and the decision to hold a 
general assay. Their master, however, had held back from the discussions about the new 
common currency – first because he was still occupied with military matters, but later, 
apparently, because he realized that the enmity he had excited among the Protestant 
estates dangerously weakened his position as elector of Saxony. To strengthen it, he 
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90
  Herrmann, Wartenberg, and Winter, eds., Korrespondenz, vol. 5, pp. 147, 158. 
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decided to join a group of princes who had formed a new anti-imperial league. In May 
1551, – that is, while the assayers were still at work in Nuremberg – Maurice concluded 
a pact with these ‘war princes’, whose leader he became.92 Charles learnt of this only in 
the autumn of that year, but he knew much earlier that the Saxon elector was negotiating 
with his enemies and by March 1551 relations had become very strained.93 
Before the Nuremberg assay had even begun, King Ferdinand issued an edict where 
he announced that the assayers would ‘probably’ value the ‘better’ talers at 68 kreuzers 
and warned his subjects to prepare for this event.94 68 kreuzers had already in 1542 
been defined as the official Austrian taler-value.95 Ferdinand thus seemed to try easing 
the introduction of the new currency by minimising the change it involved: As we have 
seen, the rate of the rhinegulden was to remain unchanged; so was that of the taler. 
What his edict did not mention was that the new common kreuzer contained less bullion 
than the traditional Austrian coin of that name. Talers of the Saxon standard should 
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have had a value of not 68, but more than 69 such kreuzers.96 Hence, one aim of 
Ferdinand’s edict was clearly to make sure that the taler would be undervalued. The 
assayers in Nuremberg took the hint. Their misgivings were obvious, but they listed the 
Saxon talers among a large number of others whose bullion content, they said, merited 
a rate of ‘in part more than and up to’ 68 new kreuzers, ‘as defined in the edict’.97 
The currency bill of July 1551 thus presented consumers with a choice: They could 
either use talers or imperial guldiners. The incentives were clear: Guldiners would be 
given preference, talers – whose value as bullion was higher than their legal value as 
coins – melted and sold to the mints. From Charles V’s perspective this was 
advantageous in every respect. On the one hand, the demise of the talers would provide 
the metal needed to produce guldiners. On the other hand, talers were the most 
important product of the Saxon mints, which made a weighty contribution to Maurice’s 
revenues.98 Driving them out of circulation would not only politically damage the new 
elector’s reputation and grandeur but also economically weaken him – as it would most 
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other ‘war princes’, who were producing talers of roughly the Saxon standard.99 While 
Charles nowhere openly said that this was his aim, he cannot but have been aware of 
what abolishing the talers implied for his opponents. As in the case of the fungibility of 
rhinegulden and guldiner, the original aim of the reform – preventing coins from being 
broken in neighbouring mints – began to fade behind a new objective. 
V. 
In 1552, Maurice of Saxony and the other ‘war princes’ revolted, invading South 
Germany and driving Charles from Tirol. The war shook the emperor’s rule to the core. 
It also delayed the reform of the Empires’ currencies. In Austria, for example the 
Imperial Monetary Ordinance came into force only after King Ferdinand had negotiated 
the peace with the opponents of the Habsburgs.100 However, once that had happened it 
quickly became obvious that crying down the talers to 68 kreuzers did not work. 
Outside Austria this measure had not yet been taken, so that Austrian consumers soon 
began to complain about foreigners buying up talers and exporting them to where they 
commanded a higher price. In Austria talers did indeed disappear from circulation, as 
intended, but they left the country rather than ending in the Austrian mints to be turned 
into guldiners.101 
One part of the Empire where talers commanded a higher price was North 
Germany. In April 1555 Duke Henry the younger of Brunswick-Lüneburg concluded a 
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contract with a number of regional imperial estates and provincial towns that fixed their 
value at 24 Saxon groschens.102 The agreement seems to have confirmed the going 
market rate of talers: In Mecklenburg, for example, this had been their value since about 
1550.103 At that rate, they were overvalued by almost 10 per cent – a huge premium 
which reflects their popularity and implies that compared to guldiners, they were ‘bad’ 
coins in the sense of Gresham’s Law. This, in turn, implies that no-one experienced in 
the trade in coinage would ever use guldiners in payments in North Germany. Rather, 
they would be withdrawn from circulation and sold as bullion – the opposite of what 
Charles V had intended. Once this became known, further repercussions were bound to 
follow. Any authority who considered issuing guldiners would realize that its product 
would end in the melting pots of the Lower Saxon mints. Unsurprisingly, few estates 
implemented the Imperial Monetary Ordinance.104 
The fate of the rhinegulden in the years following 1551 suggests that a fundamental 
problem lurked behind these developments. At a very early stage of the conference in 
Speyer, when the value of the gulden was first being discussed and long before the issue 
of the export of gold was raised, the electoral delegates had warned that ‘it would be 
impossible to keep the rate of the Rhenish gold gulden at 72 kreuzers; rather, ( … ) it 
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would climb much further’.105 This did indeed happen. In Augsburg for example, the 
gulden’s average exchange rate rose from 72.12 kreuzers in 1552 to 75.00 kreuzers in 
1558.106 As the kreuzer was not debased during these years, the upward trend of the 
exchange rate reflected the continuous fall in the value of silver relative to gold. 
However, this is not the whole story. Enforcing the circulation of coins at their legal par 
value is costly. If consumers were well-informed – and the rhinegulden-rates quoted 
above were collected from the books of professional brokers who certainly were – 
forcing them to use coins at a rate other than their market value required constantly 
monitoring the market, and this was prohibitively expensive. Hence, rhineguldens were 
neither exported nor melted and sold as raw metal; rather, they circulated at a premium. 
All this points to a dangerous illusion of power Charles V seems to have nurtured in 
the years after the Schmalkaldic War, when according to a modern biographer his 
behaviour was characterized by excessive pride.107 He was certainly powerful enough to 
bully the Rhenish electors into submission. He was also perfectly capable of seizing the 
opportunity offered by the diet of Augsburg’s ex ante agreement to any result the 
coinage experts in Nuremberg would come up with: His brother’s edict anticipated the 
assay’s outcome, thereby putting pressure on the assayers in a way that was expected to 
harm the emperor’s opponents. However, monitoring millions of transactions on 
                                                 
105
  StArchWü, MRA Münze K 137/2, fol. 8 v. 
106
  Exchange rates from Blendinger, ed., Unterkaufbücher, pp. 43-203; cf. tab. 1. 
107
  Kohler, Karl V., p. 314. Early modern German rulers seem to have tended to overestimating their 
ability to enforce economic legislation, possibly because they conceived of their subjects as a ‘super-
oikos’ they could manage like a household. Cf. Bauer and Matis, Geburt, pp. 190-6. 
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markets all over the Empire, where consumers decided what coin to spend at which 
value, far surpassed Charles’ abilities. If he had had the full support of the estates – 
including the Rhenish electors and the elector of Saxony – he might have been able to 
enforce the circulation of the rhinegulden and taler at a rate agreed by all parties; under 
the given circumstances, this was out of the question. This is why the idea to deflate 
princely debts by fixing the bimetallic ratio foundered, and why the plan to harm 
Maurice of Saxony by undervaluing the taler blew up in Charles’ face. When the 
emperor abdicated in 1556, his project of creating a common German currency had 
failed just as his power politics. 
VI. 
This article uses new primary sources to examine the creation and failure of the 
Holy Roman Empire’s common currency in the years around 1550. It advances three 
hypotheses: 
1. An influential strand of research claims that attempts to create a common currency 
failed because the Empire’s bullion markets were poorly integrated. However, at 
the coinage conference in Speyer in 1549 bullion prices were not an issue. The 
delegates quickly agreed on a common standard. They were able to do so for 
reasons of politics: Since the Schmalkaldic War, Charles V’s power had increased 
so far that now, for the first time, there was widespread belief in the viability of a 
common currency. Once all expected harmonisation to work, the silver-producing 
estates, who until then had insisted on a high mint equivalent in order to reduce the 
likelihood of their coins being broken, were willing to agree to a lower equivalent, 
thus accommodating the wishes of the estates without silver mines. 
34 
 
2. The other common explanation of the failure of an Empire-wide currency argues 
that the number of political agents was too large and the will to cooperate too weak 
to allow overcoming differences. Examining how the currency bill of July 1551 
was drafted shows, however, that effective decision making procedures were in 
place, which mitigated the problems posed by the large number of actors: Solutions 
were developed in small committees, discussed in expert conferences, and finally 
submitted to the imperial diet at large. Moreover, complaints about the ‘trade in 
coinage’ and the ‘breaking’ of coins suggest that the desire to harmonise the 
German monetary systems was widespread. As a result, the diet unanimously 
passed the currency bill.  
3. The attempt to create an Empire-wide currency failed for political reasons, and only 
after the diet had passed the bill. The crucial point was that by ex ante agreeing to 
the results of Nuremberg assay, the diet gave Charles V a carte blanche that the 
emperor used to try to weaken Maurice of Saxony: He undervalued the taler. This 
antagonised one of the most important princes of the Empire and increased the 
costs of implementing the currency project. Given that the electors on the Rhine 
had only grudgingly agreed to the bill, implementing the bimetallic ratio that it 
prescribed now became prohibitively costly, too. Neither this ratio nor the taler-rate 
proved enforceable. In north Germany, talers were over- and guldiners 
undervalued. As a consequence, guldiners and with them the common currency 
disappeared. 
In sum, harmonisation failed not because Germany was economically poorly integrated 
or the will to co-operate was lacking but rather because Charles V and the indebted 
princes tried to use monetary policies for ulterior ends. This finding qualifies the gist of 
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recent research, which stresses the economic benefits the Holy Roman Empire 
generated for its members. While the Speyer conference of 1549 and the imperial diet of 
Augsburg in 1550 to 1551 demonstrated that fruitful cooperation was possible at the 
level of the Empire, major political failures still occurred: Charles V’s monetary 
manipulations played a core role in perpetuating the diversity of currencies that 
characterized German economic life far into the nineteenth century. 
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